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iThere are three key challenges with regard to the substantive provisions of international investment agreements—limited 
object, broad investment protection, and legal uncertainty. The several mega-regional international investment agreement (IIA) 
negotiations currently under way provide what could be a “once-in-a-lifetime” opportunity to address these challenges.
There is a growing realization that IIAs should go beyond a concept of development that only focuses on economic growth. 
Development should be seen as a broader process involving economic, social, political, and legal considerations. Consensus is 
growing that IIAs should be perceived as instruments to achieve “sustainable development.” Accordingly, the think-piece puts 
forward three sets of options for policymakers to address the above mentioned three key challenges. While the three sets can be 
pursued independent of one another, it is suggested here that a combination of all of them would be the best approach.
In terms of addressing legal uncertainty of IIAs substantive provisions, the paper suggests focusing on clarifying the content and 
scope of the traditional investment protection standards of IIAs, particularly MFN, FET, expropriation, and available remedies.
In terms of addressing the breadth of investment protection guarantees, the paper suggests the following recalibration: IIAs should 
(a) focus on substantive provisions that require host states to behave in a “non-discriminatory” and “reasonable” manner; (b) omit 
those provisions that guarantee “contractual and regulatory stability” (“umbrella clauses” and “stabilization clauses”); and (c) limit 
the duty to compensate in case of expropriation to cases of “direct expropriation” only.
In terms of addressing the limited object of IIAs, the paper suggests considering extending them to cover a few key economic 
regulation issues, such as market access, corporate governance and responsibility, taxation, anticompetitive conduct, and 
investment contracts. In the long term, a few key social issues such as human rights, employment, environment, and corruption 
could also be included.
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1The objective of this think-piece is to suggest policy options 
with regard to the substantive provisions of international 
investment agreements (IIAs). The paper, ﬁrst, identiﬁes 
three key challenges with regard to the substantive 
provisions of IIAs—limited object, broad investment 
protection, and legal uncertainty. Second, the paper 
puts forward speciﬁc options for addressing these three 
challenges.
Focusing on the substantive provisions of IIAs, one can 
identify the following three key challenges—(1) the content 
or object of IIAs has traditionally been limited to affording 
protection to foreign investment (limited object); (2) the 
range of norms affording protection to foreign investment 
is broad and potentially restrictive of host states’ regulatory 
authority (broad investment protection); and (3) given their 
open-ended nature, IIAs’ investment protection provisions 
have been interpreted by arbitral tribunals in an inconsistent 
manner (legal uncertainty).
LIMITED OBJECT
While there are several underlying purposes linked to the 
conclusion of an IIA (principally, promoting economic 
relations among the contracting parties, encouraging the 
ﬂow of investment between them, and ultimately increasing 
the “prosperity” or “development” of both parties), the core 
object of IIAs focuses on affording protection to foreign 
investments, principally once they have been admitted to 
the host state. In other words, the content of IIAs includes 
mainly a series of substantive guarantees (as well as an 
investor-state dispute settlement system) intended to 
protect foreign investments. The underlying assumption 
is that “investment protection” (the object of IIAs) will 
promote economic relations, encourage investment ﬂows, 
and increase the prosperity of contracting parties (the 
purpose of IIAs). In this sense, IIAs have been thematically 
rather narrow, excluding, for example, any express 
obligations on home countries and foreign investors, as well 
as any express considerations of other relevant public policies 
(such as public health, environmental protection, public 
morals, cultural diversity, and labour rights), aside from a 
few clauses addressing “national security” or “balance-of-
payments” concerns.
While investors are generally in favour of IIAs’ protection 
guarantees, they may also consider it desirable to extend 
the traditional object of IIAs to include pre-establishment 
guarantees, such as market access commitments and the 
regulation of performance requirements (as the United 
States [US] has done in the last 20 years). On the other 
hand, investors do not want the introduction of provisions 
limiting IIAs’ protection guarantees and imposing obligations 
or requirements on investors. When one considers host 
states, they may not generally be keen to extend the 
content of IIAs beyond the core, post-establishment 
focus as they may want to maintain their sovereignty over 
whether foreign investments are allowed to enter their 
market and, if so, on what conditions. However, host states 
may be willing to grant pre-establishment guarantees 
within the context of a wider rebalancing of IIAs focused on 
maximising the development function of such agreements. 
Accordingly, next to protection guarantees and liberalization 
commitments, host states may be keen to use IIAs to 
regulate other investment-related areas such as investors’ 
conduct, taxation, national security, and protection of the 
environment.
BROAD INVESTMENT PROTECTION
The series of substantive protection guarantees found in 
IIAs entail obligations imposed on host states including, 
traditionally, national treatment; most-favoured nation 
(MFN) treatment; fair and equitable treatment (FET); full 
protection and security (FPS); the prohibition of “arbitrary,” 
“unreasonable,” or “discriminatory” impairment of the 
foreign investment; the duty to pay compensation in case 
the foreign investment is, directly or indirectly, expropriated; 
and the duty to observe any undertaking that the host state 
has entered into with regard to the foreign investment. 
Moreover, clauses dealing with transfer of funds and entry 
of personnel can commonly be found in IIAs. There may also 
be stabilization clauses. In terms of normative content, these 
substantive obligations provide four types of guarantees 
addressing (1) discriminatory conduct by the host state, 
(2) unreasonable conduct by the host state, (3) harm to 
the foreign investment, and (4) lack of contractual and 
regulatory stability. 
Therefore, the range of traditional legal instruments affording 
protection to foreign investments is rather broad. Depending 
on how IIAs are drafted and how they are interpreted by 
investment tribunals, host states may feel that these 
protection guarantees are unduly restrictive of their ability 
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2OPTIONS ADDRESSING LACK OF LEGAL 
CERTAINTY
Clarification of (traditional) investment protection 
guarantees
This option entails the least change as it merely focuses on 
clarifying the content and scope of traditional investment 
protection provisions. There is no change in the traditional 
substantive provisions, but this option provides clarity to the 
meaning of these provisions. Accordingly, there are several 
examples of recent treaty making focusing on this type of 
clariﬁcation exercise. For example,
•	 clarifying	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 MFN	 provision	 can	 be	
used to import (more favourable) provisions from other 
IIAs (while the United Kingdom [UK] model bilateral 
investment treaty [BIT] clariﬁes that MFN can be used to 
import more favourable—substantive and procedural—
provisions from other treaties, the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement [CETA] clariﬁes that MFN 
cannot be used to import other treaty clauses);
•	 providing	a	definition	of	an	“indirect	expropriation”	in	the	
text of the provision on expropriation or in an annex to 
the IIA (see US treaty practice);
•	 defining	 the	 FET	 standard	 through	 the	 inclusion	 in	 the	
treaty of an exhaustive list of more speciﬁc obligations 
(CETA);
•	 limiting	 the	 content	 of	 a	 treaty	 standard	 to	 customary	
international law (see US treaty practice with regard to 
FET and FPS).
Additional clariﬁcations should be considered (despite 
that there are not many real examples of it). For example, 
clariﬁcations may deal with the content and scope of the 
umbrella clause (does it only cover contractual obligations or 
also unilateral commitments given by the host state under 
domestic and international law? Does it cover obligations 
stemming out of the contract signed between the claimant/
investor and respondent/host state or does it extend to 
obligations entered into by the investor?). A reason for the 
lack of examples of clariﬁcation with regard to umbrella 
clauses may be that recent treaties appear to omit the clause 
altogether (see Section 3.2).
A crucial clariﬁcation revolves around the issue of available 
remedies for a breach of the investment protection obligations 
in IIAs. Despite the importance of this aspect (see, for 
example, the standard of compensation, valuation methods, 
interests, and so on), there is very little in terms of treaty 
practice (even recent) addressing the issue of remedies. Given 
the lack of discussion, the suggestion here would be to start 
discussing the kinds of remedies that should be made available 
(monetary compensation v. speciﬁc performance; retrospective 
The three challenges identiﬁed above can be addressed 
separately or jointly. Fundamentally, each entails a different 
level of complexity. In general terms, the previous section 
lists the three in a descending level of complexity. In this 
section, I will put forward options for addressing those 
challenges in reverse order. While, in principle, some of 
these challenges could be addressed at the level of treaty 
interpretation (by arbitral tribunals), the focus of this section 
will principally be on options requiring treaty making (or 
treaty amending). The opportunity afforded by the several 
mega-regional IIA negotiations currently under way, (the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership [TTIP], Trans-
Paciﬁc Partnership [TPP], European Union (EU)-China, and 
US-China), is almost a “once-in-a-lifetime” chance.
OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING 
THE THREE CHALLENGES
to regulate. With regard to the types of guarantees, investors 
are particularly keen to receive guarantees against “harm” 
or for the protection of “stability.” On the other hand, host 
states may prefer to just be subject to a requirement to 
behave in a “non-discriminatory” or “reasonable” manner.
LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
Since the investment protection obligations in IIAs have been 
drafted in general, open-ended terms, investment tribunals 
have interpreted the same obligation (in the same IIA or 
in two different ones) according to a different normative 
conception, thus creating inconsistent interpretations 
and uncertainty of investment law. For example, the FET 
provision has been interpreted as a guarantee vis-à-vis 
unreasonable conduct (for example, Impregilo v Argentina) 
and as a guarantee vis-à-vis lack of contractual and 
regulatory stability (for example, CMS v Argentina). Similarly, 
the duty to pay compensation for indirect expropriation has 
been interpreted by some tribunals as a guarantee vis-à-vis 
(substantial) harm on the foreign investment (for example, 
Metalclad v Mexico), and by other tribunals as a guarantee 
vis-à-vis unreasonable conduct by the host state (for 
example, Tecmed v Mexico). 
The lack of legal certainty when it comes to the substantive 
content of IIAs is obviously a problem for investors and 
host countries and has the potential to weaken the overall 
legitimacy of the system.
3v. prospective remedy; differentiating remedies depending on 
the kind of unlawful conduct; direct v. indirect shareholders’ 
claims; avoidance of double-recovery, simple interest v. 
compound interest, and so on).
The challenge in pursuing a clariﬁcation policy (applicable to 
existing and future IIAs) is at least three-fold.
•	 First,	treaty	makers	need	to	determine	what	the	ultimate	
result they would like to achieve is, with the clariﬁcation 
(broadening v. narrowing the content and scope of 
investment protection guarantees; for example, does 
the MFN provision apply to import more favourable 
procedural provisions found in other treaties?). 
•	 Second,	 treaty	 makers	 need	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 the	
clariﬁcation is done in a way that the desired result is 
achieved.
•	 Third,	 they	 have	 to	 decide	 how	 to	 implement	 these	
clariﬁcations with regard to existing IIAs.
The ﬁrst two aspects are clearly interlinked. The failure (or 
difﬁculty) in clearly identifying the ultimate result that 
the treaty-maker would like to achieve may lead to an 
ineffective clariﬁcation. If one looks at some of the examples 
noted above, it can be seen that recent clariﬁcations remain 
subject to different interpretations (compare, for example, 
the use of customary law with regard to FET v. FPS in the 
2012 US model BIT, and the deﬁnition of the FET standard 
in CETA, particularly the unclear role of the protection of the 
investor’s legitimate expectations).
One also needs to address the issue of existing treaties, 
so that clariﬁcations do not only apply to future IIAs. The 
clearest options are:
1. renegotiation (or amendment) of existing treaties by 
the contracting parties to clarify the key substantive 
protection guarantees;
2. a multilateral treaty that supplements (ideally) all 
existing IIAs.
There are clear challenges with either option—while the 
ﬁrst will entail multiple (several thousand) renegotiation 
or amendment processes (without the assurance that 
clariﬁcations are the same across existing treaties), the 
second will require a level of “multilateral” consensus that 
may not be present right now.
One alternative option addressing these two obstacles 
draws inspiration from the recent Rules on Transparency in 
Treaty-based Investor–State Arbitration developed by the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) and the related Convention on Transparency 
in Treaty-based Investor–State Arbitration adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 2014. 
Since the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency only apply to 
UNCITRAL arbitrations brought under IIAs concluded after 1 
April 2014, they do not apply, in principle, to all pre-existing 
IIAs. The UN Transparency Convention is aimed at giving 
those states that wish to make the UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency applicable to their existing IIAs a mechanism 
to do so. Speciﬁcally, and in the absence of reservations by 
the signatories, the Rules on Transparency will apply to any 
investor–state arbitration, whether or not initiated under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, where (i) both the respondent 
state and the home state of the claimant investor are parties 
to the Convention; and (ii) only the respondent state is 
party to the Convention but the claimant investor agrees to 
the application of the Rules. While it is still early days, this 
process may inform a similar one with regard to (at least 
some) IIAs’ substantive provisions.
Accordingly, one could envisage a similar dual-pronged 
process in order to carry out a level of clariﬁcation of 
(traditional) substantive protection guarantees in existing 
IIAs. The ﬁrst step involves reaching a consensus (similar to 
the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency) on the substance of 
the clariﬁcation with regard to the various key investment 
protection standards (for example, should the MFN provision 
be used to import [more favourable] substantive and 
procedural provisions from other IIAs or not? Similarly, what 
kind of principles should the FET standard include? What 
should be the remedies available in the case of a violation of 
an IIA?). One could even envisage the possibility of multiple 
clariﬁcations with regard to the same IIA provision.
The second step is to create a mechanism (similar to the 
UN Transparency Convention) allowing states to make the 
various clariﬁcations applicable to their existing IIAs. As 
there will be several clariﬁcations with regard to several key 
provisions of IIAs (and possibly two or more clariﬁcations 
for the same provision), the Convention could consider the 
option for states to select which clariﬁcations are applicable 
to their existing treaties. The Convention would then be 
opened for signature by any state. In order to be a signatory 
to the Convention, a state would need to subscribe to one or 
more clariﬁcations contained in the Convention.
Establishment of a permanent appeal mechanism or 
standing investment tribunal
Instead of (or in addition to) clarifying the content and 
scope of existing investment protection guarantees, a 
second option to address the lack of legal certainty (or 
consistency of interpretation) is to establish a permanent 
appeal mechanism (similar to the Appellate Body of the 
World Trade Organization [WTO]) or a standing investment 
tribunal. Both options have been on the table in the TTIP 
negotiations. Obviously, they both raise practical as well 
as political issues. Since this option addresses the issue of 
dispute settlement (which is covered by a parallel paper), it 
is not further developed here, but it is important to ﬂag the 
issue that the reform of substantive provisions is inevitably 
linked with the reform of procedural/dispute settlement 
provisions (and vice versa).
4OPTIONS ADDRESSING BROAD INVESTMENT 
PROTECTION
Identifying which types of guarantees should be granted 
to foreign investors
As mentioned above, IIAs have included a broad range of 
norms or legal instruments to protect foreign investments. 
In addition to guarantees prohibiting discriminatory and 
unreasonable conduct by the host state, IIAs have also 
included guarantees aimed at addressing (i) the lack of 
contractual and regulatory stability and (ii) substantial harm 
to the foreign investor caused by the host state. While the 
breadth of these norms represents a high level of protection 
for foreign investment, the concern today is to determine 
whether this is justiﬁed, taking into account (a) the beneﬁts 
brought by (attracting) foreign investment, and (b) the 
limitation imposed by IIAs on the host state’s right/duty to 
regulate.
This option entails a reconceptualization of the type of 
investment protection guarantees afforded to foreign 
investment. IIAs would still be principally focused on affording 
protection to foreign investments (in that sense, there is no 
change from traditional IIAs), but the aim of this option is to 
ﬁne-tune the kinds of protections that host states are willing 
to provide. In this exercise, a better understanding of the 
ultimate objective of IIAs and of the challenges that need to be 
confronted to effectively accomplish that objective is crucial. 
It is clear that the investment protection guarantees provided 
in IIAs are instruments to encourage capital ﬂows between the 
signatory countries, and, in turn, contribute to their prosperity 
(or development). However, there is a growing realization that 
IIAs should be devised as instruments going beyond a concept 
of development that only focuses on economic growth. 
Consensus is growing that development should be seen as a 
broader process involving economic, social, political, and legal 
considerations. Accordingly, economic growth without social 
equity or economic redistribution without effective political 
participation could hardly be regarded as making a meaningful 
contribution to development. There is growing consensus that 
even if just focusing on affording protection to investment, IIAs 
should be perceived as instruments to achieve “sustainable 
development” (UNCTAD 2012).
In this reconceptualization, the comparative examination 
of national, supranational, and transnational public law is 
relevant. There is a growing voice arguing that IIAs should 
impose certain principles of good public governance (such 
as fairness and reasonableness) that already feature in many 
public law systems. In other words, IIAs should be aimed at 
establishing a system of judicial review at the international 
level in the area of investment. Comparative law provides 
useful lessons on this, particularly when it comes to issues 
such as the grounds and intensity of the review of public 
functions.
Accordingly, the paper suggests the following changes. 
•	 The	 purpose	 of	 IIAs	 should	 be	 the	 promotion	 of	
“sustainable development” and it should be expressly 
stated in their preamble.
•	 The	 investment	 protection	 guarantees	 in	 IIAs	 should	
focus on requiring host states to behave in a “non-
discriminatory” and “reasonable” manner.
•	 IIAs	 should	 not	 include	 provisions	 that	 guarantee	
“contractual and regulatory stability” (“umbrella clauses” 
and “stabilization clauses”).
•	 The	duty	 to	 compensate	 in	 case	of	 expropriation	 should	
be limited to cases of “direct expropriation” only (as 
unreasonable measures that harm investors will be 
caught by the guarantee vis-à-vis unreasonable conduct).
•	 There	 is	no	need	to	provide	general	exception	provisions	
(modelled on Article XX of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade) as the prerogative to adopt measures 
to pursue legitimate public policies is inherent in the 
substantive guarantees based on non-discrimination and 
reasonableness (however, such prerogatives should be 
expressly stated in the agreement).
Accordingly, a combination of recalibration (focusing on 
non-discrimination and reasonableness guarantees) and 
clariﬁcation (providing more details on the content of such 
guarantees) will achieve a balance between the need of 
business for protection and predictability and the need 
of governments for ﬂexibility to pursue legitimate public 
policies.
Because the recalibration and clariﬁcation are aimed 
at imposing, through IIAs, certain generally recognized 
principles of good public governance on host states, there is 
no need to introduce different disciplines for different types 
of countries or classes of investors or economic sectors. As 
explained later, such differentiation should be considered 
with regard to “market access” or “pre-establishment” 
disciplines.
In terms of recent treaty practice, there are signs that 
indicate a preference (or priority) for investment protection 
guarantees that are based on the non-discrimination and 
reasonableness principles over investment protection 
guarantees aimed at ensuring stability and providing 
compensation for harm to the foreign investor. For 
example, a recent United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) review of 13 IIAs concluded 
in 2014, for which texts are available, shows that none of 
them included an umbrella clause (UNCTAD 2015). Another 
example is limiting the duty to provide for compensation 
in the case of “direct” expropriation only (see recent Brazil 
model treaty on investment).
5See Article 2.4 of the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement and 
Article 3 of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures Agreement.
1
While limiting the breadth of investment protection 
guarantees could be said to be achieved also by limiting the 
scope of application of IIAs in terms of “covered investors,” 
this option would more exactly limit the consequences 
of having broad investment protection guarantees. In 
other words, it would not really address the issue of the 
substantive breadth of investment protections, but simply 
the issue of the extent of the impact of these protections. 
Nevertheless, there is recent treaty practice that has 
addressed the so-called issue of treaty planning and/or treaty 
shopping (see CETA, for example), which may provide some 
guidance.
Conditioning the availability of investment protection 
guarantees to investor’s satisfaction/compliance with 
corporate standards
This option takes a different approach in the sense that the 
IIA would still focus on affording investment protection, but 
it would limit that protection to “meritorious” investments 
only. In other words, the IIA would condition the availability 
of its investment protection guarantees on the foreign 
investment complying with certain standards or benchmarks, 
not only at the time of establishment in the host state but 
all through the life of the investment.
Two key challenges here are (a) identifying the relevant 
corporate standards/benchmarks and (b) implementing/
operationalizing these conditions. 
With regard to relevant standards and benchmarks, reference 
to existing global standards (such as the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 
Guidelines on Multinationals or the United Nations [UN] 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights) as well 
as sector-speciﬁc standards (Equator Principles, Forest 
Stewardship Council, Kimberly Process) may be an option. 
The WTO has, for example, required Members to take into 
account “international standards” developed by international 
specialized agencies as a way to address potential trade 
barriers with regard to their technical and health-related 
regulations.1 
With regard to the issue of operationalizing these conditions, 
some level of institutional infrastructure may be needed 
to supervise/implement the conditions as it is necessary 
to ensure/certify that an investment (whether at the time 
of establishment or during its life/operation) complies 
with the relevant standards/benchmarks. The IIA itself, or 
a related committee, could identify certain specialized, 
independent ﬁrms that provide such certiﬁcation services. 
In this perspective, the experience of various environmental 
impact assessment or human rights due diligence processes, 
such as the International Financial Corporation (IFC) Guide 
to Human Rights Impact Assessment and Management, may 
provide useful insights on some of the challenges.
OPTIONS ADDRESSING THE LIMITED OBJECT 
OF IIAS
Under this umbrella, one may include a wide range of 
options going beyond the traditional, narrow function of 
“investment protection”. Here IIAs would be transformed in 
instruments for “investment regulation” at the international 
level. One can distinguish between two main categories: 
“economic regulation” and “social dimension” (Muchlinsky 
2007). While it would still constitute a change in the 
traditional limited object of IIAs, focusing on economic 
regulation may entail a less of a “jump” compared with a 
focus on both economic and social dimensions.
Economic regulation
There are certain key economic issues that could be subject 
to regulation in a broader IIA. Some may be of particular 
interest to investors.
•	 Market access: Some IIAs already provide for a certain 
level of market access (that is, liberalization) in the area 
of foreign investment. These agreements extend, in 
particular, national treatment to the pre-establishment 
phase (see North American Free Trade Agreement 
[NAFTA]). However, the great majority of existing 
IIAs only focus on post-establishment investment 
protection. Future IIAs could include provisions that 
limit the discretion of host states in allowing foreign 
investment access to their territory. Total or partial 
exclusion of foreign investors, performance requirements, 
restrictions on foreign ownership, laws regulating equity 
joint ventures between foreign and local enterprises, and 
screening laws are examples of the kinds of restrictions 
that would be regulated by IIAs. In light of a host of 
different reasons (infant industry, national security, 
lack of regulatory capacity, cultural identity, and so 
on), market access commitments should be tailored 
to the speciﬁcities of the relevant contracting parties. 
The traditional way to guarantee a level of ﬂexibility is 
through sector-speciﬁc and measure-speciﬁc exceptions 
(see negative listing in NAFTA).
•	 Anti-competitive behaviour: A broad IIA could at least 
start including some rules addressing certain (egregious) 
anti-competitive conduct/practices (see the work carried 
out in the WTO on the interaction between trade and 
competition policy as one of the so-called Singapore 
issues).
6In light of the three key challenges identiﬁed above, the 
paper has put forward three sets of options for policymakers. 
While the three sets can be pursued independent of one 
another, it is suggested here that a combination of all of 
them would be the best approach.
CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
In terms of clariﬁcation, the paper suggests focusing 
on clarifying the content and scope of the traditional 
substantive provisions of IIAs, particularly MFN, FET, 
expropriation, and available remedies.
In terms of ﬁne-tuning or recalibrating the kinds of 
protection afforded to investors by traditional substantive 
provisions, the paper suggests that future IIAs should (a) 
focus on substantive provisions that require host states to 
behave in a “non-discriminatory” and “reasonable” manner; 
(b) omit those provisions that guarantee “contractual and 
regulatory stability” (“umbrella clauses” and “stabilization 
clauses”); and (c) limit the duty to compensate in case of 
expropriation to cases of “direct expropriation” only.
In terms of addressing the limited object of IIAs, the paper 
suggests ﬁrst considering extending them to cover a few key 
economic regulation issues, such as market access, corporate 
governance and responsibility, taxation, anticompetitive 
conduct, and investment contracts. In the long term, a 
few key social issues such as human rights, employment, 
environment, and corruption could also be included.
•	 Corporate governance, liability, restructuring/
bankruptcy: There are several issues that could be 
addressed in a broad IIA with regard to the functioning of 
corporate investors operating at the global level through 
horizontal/vertical corporate structures and/or global value 
chains (GVCs). Corporate governance, corporate liability 
and corporate restructuring, and bankruptcy are three 
examples.
•	 Taxation: There is also a growing awareness of the 
importance of the link between foreign investors (as 
multinationals) and taxation. Key issues here would 
include double taxation, transfer pricing, and tax havens.
•	 Investment contracts: IIAs could include disciplines 
regulating investor–state contracts. These disciplines 
could include the express prohibition of certain clauses 
(for example, freezing clauses) or require the use of 
certain other clauses (for example, economic equilibrium 
clauses; mediation/conciliation mechanisms). On the 
other hand, these disciplines could focus on identifying 
certain best practices, which may apply with regard to 
speciﬁc sectors/industries or across the board.2
Social dimension
A further step in broadening the scope of IIAs is to address 
directly the social dimension of foreign investment. Key 
issues here would include the link between business and 
human rights, employment and industrial relations, the 
protection of the environment, and combating corruption.
While this further “expansion” is theoretically possible, it 
should only be considered for the long-term agenda. Aside 
from the political issues, the greatest practical complexity 
in introducing these additional areas is principally due to 
the need to coordinate with a host of various other on going 
initiatives pursued by national, regional, and international 
organizations.
See, for example, the Model Mining Development Agreement Project at 
www.mmdaproject.org/, and other examples listed in the State-Investor 
Contracts Toolbox of the Investment and Human Rights Learning Hub at 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/investment-and-human-rights.
2
7Muchlinski, Peter. 2007. Multinational Enterprises and the Law. 
2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
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